Making the strategic Khyber Pass irrelevant

By K.N. Pandit

With the onset of new millennium, South Asia was sucked into the vortex of multiple regional and global strategies. While taking on the prime culprit of 9/11, namely Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the US got entangled in yet another war theatre in which Taliban duo are the prime actors. A monstrous creation of two major intelligence agencies acting in tandem in the region since Zia ul Huq era now looks at both of them with eyeball to eyeball stance. The irony is that currently their focus is on Taliban rather than on Al-Qaeda, the ideological powerhouse of armed Islamic militias.

Faced with Taliban attacks on crucial military supply convoys along the strategic transport line linking Peshawar with Jalalabad, American strategists are looking for an alternate route that would render traditional passage through NWFP and Khyber Pass irrelevant. American Gene rals have already conducted feasibility survey and submitted positive reports of an alternate route.  

According to knowledgeable circles, Washington is exploring a trans-Caspian route via Azerbaijan through Baku-Ashkabad-Tirmiz sector and across the Oxus to Northern Afghanistan. This route will go across such Central Asian republics, as have good relations with the US. Security–wise it is fairly safe because it shies away from the territories of Iran and Russia as they keep a vigil on US’ movement in Central Asia.

This plan has two disadvantages. Firstly, it is a long route even for NATO supplies, and entails high cost of transportation. The rail link between Bakui and Tirmiz is missing. Secondly, there is unclear or only a hazy political situation in Caspian Sea region including Azerbaijan where Russia and Iran are supporting each other’s maritime interests to the detriment of the interests of  Azerbaijan.

Furthermore the US would not like to downgrade her priority to trans-Caspian oil and gas pipeline for which survey has already been conducted and some initiative taken.

The second option under contemplation of combined US-NATO Command is from Persian Gulf to Central Asia and then to Northern Afghanistan. Called Bandar Abbas-Ashkabad-Tirmiz route, it will reduce the distance from Azerbaijan to Ashkabad and will also eschew Russian sphere of influence.

But any serious consideration of this plan presupposes consent and cooperation of Teheran because it is the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas that is crucial to the entire plan. A railway link between Bandar Abbas seaport and Sirakhs on Iran-Turkmenistan border reportedly completed some years ago with Indian assistance, is fully functional and could be made use of if the plan works. This would dispense with the Khyber Pass and ensure safe delivery of military supplies and other consignments to the US-NATO forces engaging the Taliban in Hindu Kush foothills.

Obama administration remains sensitized to the important role Iran can play and has, therefore, decided to drop Bush era bellicosity towards that strategic Gulf State. After ascending the presidency, Obama struck a conciliatory note and the Iranian President was inclined to respond. Reportedly, some critical areas of understanding have been identified as a result of on-going Track II diplomacy.

Presence of over a million Afghan refugees in eastern part of Iran is a source of unease for the host country. They are predominantly Sunni-Hanafis and vulnerable to the Wahhabi indoctrination campaign.

As these postulates are in formative stage, a new phenomenon in regional strategy has emerged, which could change the situation drastically. The essential purpose of working out a new strategy is to deny the Taliban and their cohorts on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Durand Line) any possibility of endangering the military line of communication to Afghanistan. At the same time, denying the tribal chiefs in NWFP the enormous income by way of toll tax and other transportation levies and duties will curtail their fighting capacity and also their hitherto un-questioned supremacy in the region.

Fully aware of Iranian theocratic regime’s attitude towards Washington, the latter may not be prepared to risk dependence on Bandar Abbas-Sirakhs link for supply of military hardware and equipment to the US-NATO combined forces in Afghanistan. American Congress and Iranian Majlis both may have reservations about a bilateral arrangement of this kind.

More recently, the Gawadar seaport on the Makran coast in Pakistan’s southern province of Balochistan has caught the eye of regional strategists in Washington and at NATO headquarters. Built by China as counterpoise to American naval base in Indian Ocean, particularly her nuclear base in Diego Garcia, Gawadar’s strategic importance to the Central Asian security parameters besides that of the Gulf and littoral states, has come to be recognized with increasing significance. A link from Gawadar across Pakistani Balochistan to southern Afghanistan via Quetta would not be only the shortest and less expensive one but perhaps also more secure than any other option available at present.

Alongside its strategic importance as a military life-line to Afghan war theatre, Gawadar is now seen as a vital filling terminal for Central Asian oil and gas supplies which giant international tankers will carry to great industrial centres of the world. Gawadar can take over the job of Karachi as part of Pakistan’s naval defence fortification and leave it to remain Pakistan’s economic nerve centre. The proposed Turkmenistan- Afghanistan- Pakistan- India (TAPI) gas pipeline will most probably fork at Jalalabad with one branch going down south to Gawadar harbour and the other extending to Pakistan and India. Likewise the Sui gas pipeline in Balochistan could also be extended to Gawadar thus ensuring big revenues to Balochistan, something that has been denied to them and remains an irritant in relations between the Balochis and the federal government in Islamabad.

Commentators believe that Gawadar-Kabul route could be a far better alternative to all other options because its political fallout goes in favour of the federal government in Islamabad. It will debilitate the Taliban logistically and financially and relieve Islamabad government the hassles of impracticability of ensuring security of military supply line from Peshawar to Jalalabad across the Khyber Pass. In long term strategy this would be the vital link that could allow landlocked Central Asian states’ long-cherished access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. However, in the light of deepening interests of world powers in Central Asian energy resources – Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas – and China’s aggressive energy policy that is likely to be to the detriment of Russia’s domineering role in the region, a new Central Asian great game appears to be in the making.
(The author is the former Director of the Central Asian Studies, Kashmir University).