Mumbai suicide bombers: Inside story

By K.N. Pandita

Washington’s tough anti-terrorism policy in the aftermath of 9/11 brought exasperating pressure on Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, the ISI sponsored and Muridke (Pakistan) – based terrorist outfit entrusted with armed insurgency operations in Kashmir. The outfit split into two and, in consequence, some of its top commanders whose brain-washing in Islamic Theo-fascism had been of high pitch joined hands with Al-Qaeda.

By way of a show of solidarity with the Americans in their war against terrorism, General Pervez Musharraf’s government arrested a Karachi-based multi millionaire, Arif Qasmani, who was a major donor of ISI’s prestigious outfit LeT. He was charged of a game of double funding — the LeT and the Afghan Taliban at one and the same time.  Harakatul Jihade Islami (HJL), a major beneficiary of ISI in the sub-continent especially in Bangladesh, too, felt the heat of the US pressure on Islamabad, and jumped on the bandwagon of Al Qaeda. Its prominent leader Maulana Ilyas Kashmiri, who had been operating in Kashmir and had managed through bribe his escape from the custody of Indian security forces after two years of internment, shifted to North Waziristan along with his family. HE was arrested by Pakistani police on allegations of involvement in an attempt on the life of General Pervez Musharraf in 2004. A month later he was released from jail.

Now ISI did not want to be seen as the direct sponsor of terror in Kashmir and elsewhere in the subcontinent.  With that, Bangladesh network of Harakat disconnected itself from ISI and moved closer to Al Qaeda. From here began the trouble for Mumbai. Al Qaeda now found that in General Pervez Musharraf/s regime, it was not safe for its fidayeen to conduct their Islamic mission physically through Pakistani territory. With US plus NATO forces sitting atop Afghanistan landscape, the new route to Arab Emirates — the destination wherefrom enormous funds poured into its coffers — had to be explored. Avoiding Pakistani territory, its field operatives used the Arabian Sea route namely Gujarat – Mumbai – and then the Gulf Emirates to conduct their activities. The maritime route came into focus for the first time.

NATO felt exasperated when New Delhi declined to become a strategic partner in its war against terrorism. India did not like abandoning her non-aligned posture. When NATO and the US became more demanding for India’s active participation against Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan, it caused concern with Al Qaeda warriors. Al Qaeda was not actually interested in opening a big front against India knowing that a soft state like India with widespread logistical support available to fan out its network, Al Qaeda decided to use a low key as far as India was concerned. About a year ago, it decided to use the Islamic structure and forestall any move by India to join hands with NATO. Al Qaeda knew that there were insiders in India bringing pressure on the government to jump into the fray.

Several low profile attacks made in different parts of India during the past one year were essentially a rehearsal for a major strike to come at some specific point of time. These rehearsals exposed the loopholes in Indian security and intelligence establishments who could little discover who was behind the attacks. Corruption at Indian intelligence level might have helped them in their designs.

As Pakistan’s focus shifted from Kashmir to Waziristan and Pak-Afghan border, Kashmir jihadi network felt betrayed and isolated. Hurriyat chief, rushing to Islamabad, openly expressed his chagrin while the hardliner Ali shah Geelani questioned the intentions of General Pervez Musharraf.

Islamabad found itself in a precarious situation.  Withdrawing her hands from support to Kashmir insurgency meant a serious blow to the prestige of ISI. Come what may,  Pakistan with deep commitments could not afford to let Kashmir jihad die down, Therefore, a low profile plan to support Kashmir insurgency was drawn under the supervision of General Ashfaq Kiyani, then Director General of ISI.

But when Pervez Musharraf stepped down as the President and COAS of Pakistan, Kiyani was promoted  Army chief. Now Lt. Gen. Nadim Taj became the new Director General of ISI. He carried forward General Kiyanis’s plan and a few dozen fidayeen were imparted intensive training somewhere in the neighbourhood of Mangla Dam by retired Pakistan army officers. After completion of their training, the fidayeen recruits were sent to Karachi and from there by sea to Gujarat. They were supposed to travel to Kashmir to carry out Kiyani’s Kashmir Plan.  This was the time when some Kashmiri political leaders known for their pro-Pak proclivity, gleefully warned New Delhi of dire consequences if Kashmir question was not addressed with a sense of urgency.

A major reshuffle in ISI two months ago, obviously under the pressure from Washington, had almost put the Kashmir plan in cold store. The re-shuffle had come in the wake of exacerbation of hostilities in the tribal area and the US’ direct missile hits on Taliban and al Qaeda targets in North Waziristan area. In the process of this re-shuffle, the Director of External Wing of ISI was also changed and the charge of Kiyani’s Kashmir Plan was given in the hands of an ISI Section Head (a Major) and a Pakistani LeT commander named Zakiu’r-Rahman.

In Karachi, Zaki oversaw the progress of the plan. As the ISI got deeply occupied with the war on terrorism in northern tribal areas, the conductors of Kashmir Plan found that they could proceed on their own and not wait for instructions from their superiors. However LeT and HJI networks in Bangladesh and their field workers in India aspired to win a name for them and as such they tailored the plan for implementation in Mumbai and not in Kashmir. The rest is history.
(The writer is the former Director of the Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir).
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