Nuke deal and understatements
(See M.K. Kaul’s answer on Maharaj K. Kaul’s Blog, and see Heidi’s comment ‘Democracy and slow progress‘ on the Humanitarian Texts).
By K.N. Pandita
The hornlock on Indo-Us nuclear deal does not portend well for the coalition government. As things unfold, the real problem is not in what the US wants India to do or not to do in regard to her nuclear capability: the real trouble lies in both sides trying to understate their motivation; one pushing the deal and the other obstructing it. What are kept under wraps are political undercurrents of the entire issue.
The comrades, no less than their opponents, are aware of immense potential lying in the deal’s womb capable of transforming India’s economy and quality of life drastically once things start moving. Raising the quality of life also means gradual erosion of their constituency. This weighs heavy on their mind.
One imperceptible undercurrent is that in a parliament where the Marxists have always held king-maker’s position without directly shouldering any responsibility or accountability, the coalition government is inching towards closer collaboration with the “enemy of Islam” viz. the US. The interests of the Muslims have always remained first priority with them. Known for its traditional anti-American stance, mostly as a habit and also as patent rhetoric, the Indian Left knows when to hunt with the hare or run with the hound. When in the aftermath of Indian army’s reverses in Indo-China war of 1962, Prime Minister Nehru made frantic appeals to President Kennedy to send him arms and war material to resist incursions of the army of the PRC, the Indian Maoists-Marxists turned their face away least they were caught on the wrong foot.
Indian comrades have seldom conceded majority right though in the present case it wants to derive the desired mileage out of the numerical majority formula applicable to the parliament. It has always fixed its gaze on a specific vote bank segment. In essence its approach hardly touches the fringes of universal suffrage in spirit. As Muslims all over the world have become patently antagonistic to the United States after 9/11, and also for the Bush administration’s subsequent policy towards Islamic radicals and terrorists, the Indian Left is eager to cash on that sentiment. The nuclear deal, if allowed to go through, would, in their chemistry, mean dealing a hard blow to detestable vote bank syndrome.
From this one more inference can be drawn. Are the comrades really interested in supporting Indian civil society in its resistance to the threat posed by the radicals and the terrorists? The hindsight reveals that the Indian Left has maintained Sphinx-like silence on the issue of expanding theo-fascism. The nuclear deal, if it is through, shall leave them with little rather no elbow room.
The understatement on the part of the ruling Congress party is that it would not want to displease the Muslim community by revealing the necessity of the government to collaborate with the US to meet the menace of the theo-fascists. The fact is that both countries have now a fair understanding and experience of the threat facing emerging or established democracies and their institutions in the Asian continent. India is the biggest and the strongest Asian bulwark against the menace that has surfaced in 21st century. The fundamental point in the philosophy of countering the threat according to Indian policy planners is not the use of force but total economic transformation of the society. And India cannot wait any longer. That will be suicidal.
Evidently, Pakistan and Iran, both enjoying the patronage of India’s potent rival – another Asian giant – would be at pains to see the largest democracy and emerging economic power finding reason to tune in to the US wavelength. China has already conveyed her apprehension of the contemplated deal arguing it could unhinge the balance of power in the region. The reason why Washington never offered an identical deal to China in the past was that it would not want to hold back the potent rival of the erstwhile Soviet Union from developing an adequate nuclear deterrent.
Thirty-four years have elapsed when India detonated her first atom bomb. The second came in 1998. In between, India was faced with Kargil war. But far from using the weapon of mass destruction to eliminate the enemy, she did not even speak of a threat of using it. This shows that India has matured in international relations and diplomacy. The use of nuclear bomb by any its possessor is generally unthinkable, given present international political scenario.
What then are the apprehensions that India goes in for another nuclear test if needed? We know that foolproof safeguard of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is a moot point. There are murmurs about unsatisfactory control and command management of nuclear bombs and weapons in Pakistan. The US has, more than once, given expression to the apprehension of these weapons falling in the hands of radicals and terrorists in Pakistan who are commanding logistical advantage at present. Evidently, when the Indo-US experts were discussing related issues over long and protracted negotiations; they must not have missed the point.
India has severe constraints of developing adequate security structure vis-a vis regional and global strategies, and to work tirelessly for economic transformation. The nuclear deal with the US has to be viewed from these parameters.
(The writer is the former Director of the Centre of Central Asian Studies, Kashmir University).